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This paper analyses the effects of the Single European Market and Swedish Investment
liberalisation on the structure of Swedish multinationals with their EU affiliates. The
empirical results suggest that the determinants associated with horizontal and vertical
multinationals have become increasingly relevant between 1974 and 1994. Horizontal
multinationals are increasingly deterred by large plant-level economies of scale,
increasingly associated with large trade costs and relative factor endowment similarities,
while vertical multinationals are increasingly associated with relative factor endowment
differences. This suggests that integration has increased competitive pressures to
increase efficiency in exploiting economies of scale, and specialisation according to
comparative advantages.
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1.Introduction
This paper analyses Swedish investment liberalisation and the Single European
Market programme and its implications for the structural composition of the relationship
between Swedish multinationals and their EU affiliates. More specifically, it analyses
the effects of these policy changes on the extent of horizontal and vertical integration
between Swedish parents and their EU affiliates. In doing so, it extends the paper by
Mathä (2000), which analysed the empirical relevance of the determinants associated
with horizontal and vertical multinationals.
This paper is organised as follows: Section 2 describes the developments of
importance to Swedish multinationals and their European affiliates during the 1980s and
1990s. Section 3 explores the theoretical aspects and derives the hypotheses. Section 4
briefly presents the data, variables and the econometric specification. Section 5 analyses
the empirical results, and section 6 concludes.
2. SEM, SIL and Horizontal versus Vertical Multinationals
World-wide FDI flows rose dramatically towards the end of the 1980s, as have
Swedish outward FDI flows. In fact, Sweden experienced one of the single largest
increases in, and highest levels of, total FDI outflows relative to GDP of all OECD
countries in the period 1985-1994. As figure 1 indicates, Swedish FDI outflows relative
to GDP reached an unprecedented 6.4% in 1990. After the recession in the beginning of
the 1990s, Swedish outward FDI flows started to rise again in the mid 1990s. In 1998,
Swedish outward FDI flows reached new record heights in exceeding 10% of Swedish
GDP!
There are a number of reasons that contributed to the phenomenal rise of
Swedish outward FDI flows in the late 1980s. The worldwide FDI boom between 1986
and 1990 was just one factor. The more significant factors relate to Sweden’s economic
performance, Swedish investment liberalisation, and European integration, to which we
will now turn.2
Figure 1:
Swedish outward FDI flows, absolute and as share of GDP, years 1982-1998
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Source: Homepage of Swedish Central Bank and Statistics Sweden (1999)
1.1. The Effects of European Integration
One key factor behind this increase in FDI flows is clearly the Single European
Market (SEM) programme of the European Community. In removing artificial trade
barriers, such as government procurement biases, and harmonising regulatory standards,
the SEM was aimed at leading the EC from a segmented market towards one large
unified market. Following assessments of the likely economic effects of the SEM, it was
concluded that there were substantial benefits to be reaped. In particular, industries
characterised by high degrees of imperfect competition and economies of scale were
expected to benefit most, as EU wide competition would lead to increased efficiency,
due to better exploitation of economies of scale, and thus lead to cost reductions, lower
consumer prices and simultaneous expansion of production. Furthermore, member states
have the opportunity of increasing specialisation according to comparative advantages
(e.g. Emerson et al., 1988). The consequences are twofold; it was feared that, firstly, EU
firms were able to improve their competitive positions vis-à-vis non-EU firms in third
markets, and secondly, that non-EU firms’ market positions within the EU market
would be eroded. Together with the positive estimates for increased future growth (e.g.
Baldwin, 1989) these factors are incentives enough for firms to relocate to and/or
expand production within the EU.
1
                                                
1  Back in the 1960s and 70s, empirical studies already showed that market size and growth rates were
important determinants in the EC’s attraction of US FDI. For a review see for example UNCTAD
(1993). This is also supported by the results of Aristotelous & Fountas (1996), which also point in the
direction that market size matters.3
The general worldwide FDI boom among the developed countries in the second
half of the 1980s aside (e.g. UNCTAD, 1997), there is some evidence to suggest that
this rush to the EU was a consequence of the Single European Market programme
(European Commission, 1996, 1997). This is borne out by the increasing proportion of
intra-EU FDI flows to total EU FDI flows, which increased from 41% in 1984, to 55%
in the period 1985-90, and 62% in the period 1991-93 (European Commission, 1997).
The influence of the SEM is also indicated by the EU’s changing shares in the World
Foreign Direct Investment Inward Stock, which declined from 36.7% to 29.3% in the
five years 1980-85, i.e. the years just before the announcement of the Single European
Act in 1985, and increased in the following five years from 29.3% to 40.0%. From 1990
to 1995 the share fell slightly, which can be attributed to Asia gaining in importance
(Dunning, 1997a). This is also the case for Swedish FDI flows, where Asia could attract
an increasing share in the 1990s.
Figure 2:
Swedish outward FDI flows into different regions, years 1982-1998


























































EC-12 EFTA Japan USA TOTAL
Source: Homepage of Swedish Central Bank
Most of the EU directed FDI flows came from third countries such as the USA,
the EFTA countries, and Japan. These countries accounted for 33%, 31%, and 11%
respectively of the accumulated inward FDI flows to the EU between 1984 and 1993
(Eurostat, 1995). In a simulation study, Baldwin, Forslid & Haaland (1995) came to the
conclusion that the creation of the SEM led to an investment diversion effect for EFTA
countries and an investment creation effect for EU countries.
Another important factor contributing to the rush into Europe is of specifically
Swedish nature; A general worsening of Sweden’s economic performance during the4
1980s. Between 1970 and 1991 growth of GDP per person employed lagged behind the
OECD average by 0.6%, while growth of output in the manufacturing sector grew
approximately 0.3% slower. Reasons that may have contributed to this decline are, on
one hand, the policy induced low return of human capital. Similarly, the return on
physical capital has continuously been rather low when compared to other countries. On
the other hand, hourly wage increases permanently exceeded productivity growth,
leading to inflation pressure and subsequent devaluations of the Swedish Krona to
restore international competitiveness (Lindbeck et al., 1994).
As figure 2 demonstrates, Swedish FDI flows were primarily directed towards
the EU between 1987 and 1992. The reported increase in FDI flows to the EFTA
countries in 1998 is due to huge Swedish investments in Finland, which is still labelled
as EFTA country in this figure. Within the EU, the main share of Swedish FDI was
targeted at the four big EC countries, i.e. Germany, France, the UK and Italy. As shown
in figure 3, in absolute terms the Southern European countries did not attract any
significant FDI flows from Sweden.
Figure 3:
Swedish outward FDI flows into Different EC regions, years 1982-1998


























































EC-6 EC-3 EC-South EC-Big4 EC-12
Source: Homepage of Swedish Central Bank
A similar picture emerges when analysing the number of foreign affiliates, total
assets and total employment per country and the changes therein. Between 1986 and
1990, the number of affiliates increased virtually for all EC-6 countries, except in
France. The smaller countries, such as the Netherlands and Bel-Lux countries in
particular, could attract new investments from Sweden. The countries, which could
attract most new investments, were the UK and Germany, i.e. incidentally Sweden’s two5
most important trading partners. The EC-South could attract most new investments from
Sweden in relative terms. However, these changes were not very large in absolute terms.
Table 1:
Total number of foreign affiliates, total assets in current prices,
and total affiliate employment, years 1986-1994, per country
Total no. of foreign
affiliates
Total assets in current
prices
Total affiliate employment
Year 1986 1990 1994 1986 1990 1994 1986 1990 1994
EC-6 204 241 210 51855 99498 140344 93000 114182 94705
Bel-Lux 13 17 19 5188 10651 17734 9036 9881 9594
France 58 53 44 9779 14004 20735 18024 18431 15005
Italy 32 46 33 16991 24146 38675 30226 29460 29318
Netherlands 25 35 35 5239 7661 10032 7905 11330 9037
Germany 76 90 79 14658 43036 53168 27809 45080 31751
EC-3 100 139 111 13996 30581 33932 27878 48994 31072
Denmark 40 46 37 5374 8433 7003 10669 11615 8016
UK 55 87 68 8217 21263 26250 16167 36463 22287
Ireland 5 6 6 405 885 679 1042 916 769
EC-South 30 33 23 4307 12200 11070 11436 15564 9438
Portugal 9 10 8 1401 2861 2807 3450 3925 1368
Spain 21 21 14 2906 9123 8113 7986 10952 7815
Greece 0 2 1 0 216 150 0 687 255
All 334 413 344 70158 142279 185346 132314 178740 135215
Source: Andersson et. al. (1996) and Braunerhjelm & Ekholm (1998)
The investment activity slowed down, however, during at the beginning of the
1990s. To a large extent, this can be attributed to the international recession and to the
divestment of acquired affiliates, which do not contribute to the core activities.
Similarly, Swedish outward FDI plummeted abruptly in 1991. This is borne out in
Figures 1 and 2. This sudden halt can be entirely explained by the worst economic
recession since the 1930s to hit Sweden between 1991 and 1994. Swedish GDP fell by
6% between 1991 and 1993, while manufacturing output fell by approximately 17%.
This recession was accompanied by a huge depreciation of the Swedish Krona. The
depreciation was approximately 20% against the ECU between September 1992 and
May 1993 (Lindbeck et al., 1994).
In 1993, Swedish outward FDI began to rise again. There are, however, some
interesting differences between the FDI boom in the late 1980s and that in the 1990s.
This is revealed in Figure 4. The rise in Swedish outward FDI was accompanied by a
simultaneous rise in inward FDI flows. The largest increase in FDI inflows to Sweden
came from the USA. Moreover, for the first time in three decades, outward FDI was
outstripped by inward FDI in 1993.6
Figure 4:
Swedish net outward FDI flows to different regions
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Source: Homepage of Swedish Central Bank
2.2. Swedish Investment Liberalisation (SIL)
The ultimate aim of the SEM is a true internal market, which incorporates the
four freedoms, i.e. the free mobility of goods, services, labour and capital. Capital
mobility was restricted in many European member states and other third countries, such
as Sweden, until the mid-1980s. Removing this restriction has important implications,
especially for the existence of multinationals. It was not until the mid 1980s that
Sweden started to liberalise its financial markets. In 1986, the external financing
requirement was abolished, and in 1987, the deregulation was extended, to include real
estate abroad. From 1989 onwards, this included insurance (OECD, 1996). Not
surprisingly therefore, Swedish banks, real estate and insurance companies increased
their investments abroad by 500% in current prices during the years 1987-1990
(Andersson & Fredriksson, 1993).
Prior to 1986, Swedish firms had to apply for the permission of the Bank of
Sweden to invest abroad. The reason for these restrictions was the fear of Foreign Direct
Investment worsening Sweden’s balance of payments. Firms wishing to invest abroad
had to demonstrate that their investments were not substitutes for Swedish exports
(Swedenborg, 1985).
On the one hand, permission was almost always granted, which leads
Swedenborg (1985) to conclude that the capital mobility restrictions did not7
significantly affect the level or composition of Swedish FDI.
2 Foreign production by
Swedish multinationals has rapidly increased during the period 1960-94, despite the
presence of these capital mobility restrictions. Between 1965 and 1994, the yearly
average increase in total affiliate sales was 14.3%. This rapid increase may also have
been a consequence of Swedish trade unions adopting a favourable position towards
outward FDI. Reasons behind their favourable position may include Sweden’s low
unemployment levels up until the recession at the beginning of the 1990s. Thus, the
possibility of outward FDI leading to negative home country effects were of only minor
concern. Moreover, trade unions were not only well informed about firms’ investment
plans due to their guaranteed worker participation at the management level of Swedish
firms, but for the same reason, they could also veto any job threatening FDI decisions.
Trade unions were also consulted during the FDI application process in order to
determine the likely employment effects. In addition, as Swedish trade unions are highly
centralised at a national level, they take into consideration the effects of FDI on both
aggregate employment and on industrial growth (Blomström & Kokko, 1997).
On the other hand, the fact that permission was almost never denied is, however,
no indication per se that capital controls have not affected the level and composition of
Swedish outward FDI, as firms knew the formal requirements for a successful
application. Firms knowing that they could not meet these requirements would certainly
have been discouraged to apply in the first place.
Also, a number of Swedish studies have found empirical support for the
suggestion that multinational production and exports are complements (Swedenborg,
1979, 1982; Blomström et al., 1988). These results are however challenged by Svensson
(1996). He demonstrates that affiliate exports to third countries may substitute for parent
exports to third countries. This is particularly interesting for two reasons. Firstly, this
effect appears to be particularly prominent for European affiliates. These affiliates are,
therefore, also used as export platforms. Secondly, he uses data spanning from 1974 to
1990, while the other studies refer to data from the 1960s and 1970s. It would have been
very interesting for the purpose of this paper to know whether structural differences
emerge after 1986.
                                                
2  It has been estimated that only about 1% of all applications have been denied during the second half of
the 1970s. For a review see Blomström & Kokko (1994, 1997).8
Table 2:
Total parent exports to EC and to EC affiliates, which are accounted for by
intermediate products
Parents’ intermediates exports to
affiliates as share of  parents’
total exports to affiliates
Parents’ intermediates exports to
affiliates as share of  total parent
exports to the EC
Industry 1986 1990 1986 1990
Basic Industries 79% 65% 5% 3%
Chemicals 61% 81% 10% 19%
Engineering 50% 75% 12% 33%
All Industries 53% 75% 12% 18%
Source: Andersson et al. (1996)
Complementarity of affiliate production and exports is the likely outcome if
multinationals are either forward and / or backward integrated. Table 2 illustrates that,
judging from aggregate data, Swedish multinationals, indeed, seem to be to a significant
extent vertically integrated with their EU affiliates. However, as argued previously, it is
not entirely clear whether this position reflects the natural position of Sweden, or
whether it reflects an artefact of the capital mobility restrictions and a result of the
remaining non-tariff barriers being in place until the mid 1980s.
In 1990, almost 50% of all affiliates did not import from the parent company at
all. This is illustrated in table 3. Thus, on aggregate, these statistics point towards
increased horizontal multinational activity.
Table 3:
Import propensities of foreign affiliates,
and the proportion of intermediates in their total imports, by entry mode
Measure 1970 1974 1978 1986 1990
Greenfield Investment
Total imports from parents / sales 20% 21% 22% 20% 20%
Share of intermediates 35% 44% 46% 53% 78%
Proportion of affiliates without imports from
parent
n.a. 18% 11% 16% 19%
Acquisition
Total imports from parents / sales 8% 10% 10% 7% 7%
Share of intermediates 53% 59% 66% 52% 63%
Proportion of affiliates without imports from
parent
n.a. 28% 30% 38% 47%
Source: Andersson et al. (1996)9
Table 2 suggested, however, that the relationship between Swedish parents and
their EU affiliates be increasingly of a vertical nature. This apparent contradiction is
demonstrated in table 4, which refers to the sample used in the estimations. The table
shows three different measures of vertical forward integration and one measure of
vertical backward integration between Swedish parents and their EC affiliates. For each
of these measures, three different statistics are presented. There are significant
differences with regard to the median, the average, and the aggregate share. It is striking
that the basic conclusion depends on which of the different statistics is referred to.
Table 4:
Vertical integration between parent and European affiliates,




















1974 52.3% 8.4% 4.2% 2.8%
1978 46.0% 4.2% 4.2% 2.0%
1986 41.1% 6.3% 4.7% 1.9%
1990 36.0% 0.4% 0.0% 1.2%
1994 25.0% 0.3% 0.6% 1.6%
Average
b
1974 52.4% 19.8% 9.4% 12.5%
1978 53.4% 15.5% 10.5% 15.7%
1986 44.0% 12.9% 9.6% 9.2%
1990 46.0% 11.4% 8.1% 10.3%
1994 43.4% 15.0% 9.5% 10.3%
Aggregate share
c
1974 38.3% 13.1% 6.2% 3.19%
1978 49.4% 15.6% 9.6% 4.19%
1986 50.4% 12.8% 7.9% 6.99%
1990 69.6% 18.7% 8.8% 6.84%
1994 74.8% 21.3% 11.4% 15.3%
a,b median or average of the respective share per parent company.
c the sum of parents’ total intermediate exports to affiliates as share of the sum of total exports to
the EC, total exports to EC affiliates, or total EC affiliate sales.
For all three different measures of vertical forward integration, the median
reveals a clear tendency to fall over time. The tendency towards more predominantly
horizontally integrated multinationals is particularly evident for the two measures,
which are expressed as the share in either total parent exports to the EC or as the share
in total EC affiliate sales. For the these two measures, the median dropped from 6.30%
and 4.65% in 1986 to 0.44% and 0.00% in 1990 respectively. With regard to the
average, the picture is mixed. With regard to parents’ intermediates exports as a share of10
EC affiliate sales, there is for example no indicative tend, while it is possible to observe
a slight negative trend for the other two measures of vertical forward integration. To the
contrary, the aggregate share shows a continuing trend of increasing. This is particularly
the case after 1986. Moreover this table successfully replicates some of the descriptive
statistics presented by Andersson et al. (1996), as shown in table 2.
The underlying reason for these differences may be that the larger and well-
established Swedish multinationals are predominantly vertically integrated, while the
new and smaller multinationals are primarily horizontally integrated. Furthermore,
despite the increase in the relative number of predominantly horizontally integrated
multinationals in the total population of Swedish multinationals, the extent of vertical
integration between parent affiliates has increased on aggregate. Thus, the larger
multinationals expanded their European operations more rapidly, and thereby chose
increasingly to vertically integrate.
Similar differences can be found with regard to the measure of vertical backward
integration. The median shows signs of increased horizontal integration. In 1994, the
median started to increase again. The average declined between 1974 and 1986 and
increased thereafter, while the aggregate share shows signs of increased vertical
backward integration over time, and a particularly strong increase between 1990 and
1994. The reasons are similar to those given for the different measure of vertical
forward integration. The increase in affiliate exports to Sweden may be explained with
large multinationals acquiring large foreign firms, which previously exported to
Sweden. Thus, on aggregate, Swedish multinationals appear to be vertically backward
integrated.
Therefore the question may be posed as to whether the observed
complementarity between multinational production and exports reflects the natural
position of Sweden, or whether it reflects an artefact of the capital mobility restriction
that was in place until the mid 1980s?
3. Theoretical Aspects
On the theoretical front there have been numerous developments incorporating
multinationals into general equilibrium new trade theory in recent years. Most of the
contributions focus on the determinants of horizontal multinationals (e.g. Brainard,11
1993; Markusen & Venables (1996a,b, 1998). This case has also been argued to be
empirically of more relevance (e.g. Markusen, 1995; Davies & Lyons, 1996).
Markusen et al., 1996 provide a synthesis of the determinants of respective
horizontal and vertical multinationals. This also seems to be the relevant theoretical
framework in the case of Swedish multinationals in the EU. Firstly Swedish
multinationals show significant signs of vertical integration with their European
affiliates, and secondly both the determinants of horizontal and vertical multinationals
are found to be of relevance (Mathä, 2000). The propositions of the theoretical model by
Markusen et al. (1996) are summarised in table 5.
Table 5:










•  firm-level economies of scale are large,
•  plant level economies of scale are low,
•  countries are large,
•  trade costs are moderate to high,
•  countries are similar in their relative factor
endowments,





•  trade costs are moderate to low,








•  trade costs are low and countries are similar in their
relative factor endowments and size,
•  trade costs are moderate and countries are very
different in size.
Source: Markusen et al., (1996)
The emergence of horizontal and vertical multinationals depends on the level of
firm-level economies of scale and trade costs relative to plant-level economies of scale,
country size and relative factor endowment differences and similarities. For example, if
the two countries in question are both similar with regard to their relative factor
endowments and their size, and trade costs are high, horizontal multinationals would
tend to emerge. The basic idea is simply that potential multinationals need large firm-
level or multi-plant economies of scale, i.e. firm specific assets, to successfully compete
with indigenous firms. Additionally, they trade off the benefits of proximity to
consumers, which saves transport costs, with single plant production, which enables the
firm to benefit from plant-level economies of scale. The removal of an investment ban12
would not result in the emergence of horizontal multinationals in the case of low
transport costs, as setting up affiliates abroad requires additional plant set up costs,
without being able to save transport costs. In the opposite, i.e. high transport costs,
horizontal multinationals would tend to emerge.
If relative factor endowments are very different, and the smaller country is
relatively well endowed with the production factor intensively used in the upstream
production process, i.e. provision of skilled labour intensive headquarter services, we
would expect small country based vertical multinationals to emerge. This is if trade
costs are sufficiently low. In this case vertical multinational production offers two cost
advantages over exporting. Low factor prices of the respective production factors used
intensively in the respective production stages, i.e. skilled labour in headquarter services
in the home country and unskilled labour in final production in the host country, and not
least important low transport costs.
In this context of this model, the Swedish position seems to correspond to the
case of a small country, which is well endowed with the production factor intensively
used in headquarter services. Firstly, Sweden has a disproportionate share of the largest
multinationals in the world in relation to its country size (Andersson et al., 1996).
Secondly, as illustrated in table 2, Swedish multinationals are to a significant extent
vertically integrated with their EU affiliates. This is if the composition of Swedish
multinationals is described at the aggregate level.
If country size differences become too pronounced, however, production in the
smaller country cannot be sustained any more, as the output level is not sufficient to
recoup the fixed costs for the additional production plant. Hence, the association of
horizontal multinationals with large, but similar country sizes.
The Effects of SEM and SIL
SEM and SIL potentially affect the structural composition of Swedish
multinationals in numerous ways. Some of these individual effects may be overlapping,
and hence reinforcing each other, while others may move into opposite directions.
Clearly, the effects cannot be pinpointed to its effects on one single independent
variable. In other words, the impacts of the SEM and SIL cannot be measured solely by
a dummy variable, for example by indicating the significance of non-tariff barriers in
different industries.13
Rather, the impact of the SEM and SIL is a dynamic process and is mainly
affects the structural composition of Swedish multinationals through its effect on other
variables.
3 Variables likely, and subsequently also proven, to be affected by the SEM
programme are per capita income levels and differences, and the structure and location
of industries. These effects will gradually build up over time. The short run effects
mainly consist of increased efficiency and competition via better exploitation of
economies of scale and improved allocation of production factors according to
comparative advantages. Meanwhile, the medium and long-term effects are associated
with reallocation and accumulation effects, such as improved growth rates and changes
in per capita incomes. (Emerson et al., 1988; European Commission, 1996). In terms of
the Markusen et al. (1996) model, it is therefore not appropriate to regard the effects of
the SEM and SIL as a simple reduction in variable trade costs.
The effects of Swedish investment liberalisation are straightforward. If they
really had an effect on the composition of multinationals and the relationship with their
affiliates, then SIL can be regarded as a relaxation of external constraints. A similar
statement may be made about the SEM, if it achieves what it set out to achieve, i.e. the
removal of the remaining non-tariff barriers, market imperfections and inefficiencies.
The implications of the SEM for horizontal and vertical multinationals are very similar
to those of the SIL.
Non-tariff barriers reduce competition, as firms can survive profitably despite
producing below the minimum efficient scale of production. NTBs also impede
specialisation of industries, as less efficient and productive locations are sheltered from
competition. The removal of these non-tariff barriers puts these industries under
increasing pressure to restructure and become more efficient. Therefore, the exploitation
of economies of scale will become more important in both the intermediate and the final
goods markets.
Additionally, EU integration will lead to the relocation of some production to
more efficient regions in the Community. Such relocation will also result in further
geographical fragmentation of production stages with different factor intensities along
the line of countries’ respective comparative advantages. In the case of vertical
multinationals, it is thus likely that relative factor endowment differences, and
                                                
3  e.g. Dunning (1997a,b) on the effects of the SEM.14
differences in technology, skill and human capital will become more important location
factors than they were prior to the EU integration process.
Summarising the discussion, it can be argued that both SEM and SIL will relax
the artificial constraints, which were in place prior to mid 1980s. Hence, the
determinants associated with the respective multinationals are expected to become
increasingly relevant for the determination of Swedish multinationals and the nature of
integration with their EU affiliates.
Table 5 cont’d:
Effects of Single European Market and Swedish Investment Liberalisation
Hypothesis  11: SEM and SIL lead to the increasing association of the horizontally and
vertically integrated multinationals with their respective determinants
(Hypotheses 1-8).
4. Data, Econometric Specification and Variable Definition
4
The data is taken from the database at the Research Institute of Industrial
Economics (IUI) in Stockholm. This database contains information on the foreign
operations of individual Swedish multinationals with more than 50 employees in the
manufacturing industry. We shall consider the operations of Swedish multinationals in
ten individual EU member states. Ireland and Luxembourg had to be excluded, the
STAN database, from which industrial variables were taken, includes neither of these
countries. Data for Germany refers to West Germany prior to 1990 and to united
Germany from 1991 onwards. The variables are defined in million SEK and 1990
prices. The analysis covers the years 1974, 1978, 1986, 1990 and 1994. The data set is
pooled over these years. Interaction variables are used to test for structural differences
between horizontal and vertical multinationals.
The dependent variable AFFSH takes account of exports and multinational
production being simultaneously determined. It is defined in table 6, where the
production volume of a multinational i in country k at time t is defined as the sum of all
affiliates’ total sales in country k at time t minus the sum of their total imports from
their parent company in Sweden at time t. Thus, pure resale activities of imported
products are separated from affiliates’ production from. Exports are defined as firm i’s
total exports to country k at time t. Exports include both exports of finished products,
                                                
4  The data, variables and specification are identical to Mathä (2000).15
which may be sold by the affiliate in country k, and intermediate products, which are
used by the affiliate for further processing. Horizontal and vertical multinationals are
distinguished in employing interaction variables, which take account of the extent of
vertical integration between parent and its EU affiliates.
AFFSH is censored at both tails, as firms export to EU countries. As estimation
by Ordinary Least Squares will result in biased coefficient estimates (e.g. Maddala,
1983; Greene, 1993) we formulate a Tobit regression model, which accounts for
censoring at both the lower and upper tail.
Table 6
Table with Variables and Data Sources











R&Di,t The ratio of total R&D expenditure
to world-wide sales
IUI database
LSCALEi,k,t The log of the ratio of the average plant size
in terms of employees to the firm size in the
Swedish market
Firm size taken form IUI database.
Swedish industry census of
production at the 3 and 4 digit level
of the ISIC classification.  Years
1975, 1978, 1987, 1990, 1993.
LTRADEi,t The log of industry specific trade and
packaging costs expressed as share of
industry sales
Swedish industry census of
production at the 3 and 4 digit level
of the ISIC classification.  Years
1975, 1978, 1987, 1990, 1993.
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OECD STAN database, at the 3 digit
level of the ISIC classification.16
Table 6 con’t
Table with Variables and Data Sources
























VFBEU VFEU VBEU it it it ,, , =+
IUI Database
Note: The subscript i, j, k, and t denotes the firm, industry, country, and time specific component,
respectively. The prefix L denotes that the variable is expressed in logarithmic form to reduce
heteroscedasticity. This was not possible for R&D as some values contain zeros.
5. Econometric Results
All estimations are shown in the respective tables in the appendix. Specification
(I) concerns the estimates of forward integrated multinationals, i.e. uses the interaction
variable  VFEU, while specifications (II), concerns those of vertically backward
integrated multinationals, i.e. VBEU. Specification (III) employs VFBEU as interaction
variable.
We separate the sample according to the two different sub-periods in order to
analyse the effects of European integration and Swedish investment liberalisation.
5
Hence, each specification appears twice, the only difference being the length of pre-
integration and integration sub-period samples. This is done to see how robust the
results are to period-specific sub-samples. The estimates for the period 1974-1994 are
identical to those in Mathä (2000). They serve as a benchmark for the log-likelihood
Ratio tests, identifying firstly whether there is a structural break in the series, and
secondly whether the structural break is stronger with regard to the sub-periods 1974-
1978 and 1986-1994 or for the sub-periods 1974-1986 and 1990-1994. A priori it is not
evident when exactly the hypothesised integration effects may emerge. From the Log
Likelihood Ratio statistics, it seems that the structural break is stronger if the samples
are separated into the sub-periods 1974-1986 and 1990-1994.
                                                
5  Time specific interaction variables could also have been used. This would, however, have meant to
estimate two-way interaction variables, which would have made the analysis less tractable.17
Also, the interpretation of the empirical results emphasises the differences in the
sub-samples, and not the differences between horizontal and vertical multinationals. A
detailed analysis of the latter can be found in Mathä (2000).
5.1. Specifications (I), (II), (III)
Firstly, the results demonstrate that the share of affiliate production of Swedish
multinationals is both explained by the determinants associated with horizontal
multinationals and vertical multinationals. These results seem quite robust across
different types of vertical integration as well as robust to across different time sub-
periods. It also appears that the strength of the determinants is larger in the integration
sub-periods 1986-1994 and 1990-1994 than in the pre-integration counter periods.
Horizontal versus Vertical Multinationals
The share of foreign production to total foreign sales, AFFSH, of horizontally
integrated multinationals are primarily explained by low plant-level economies of scale
relative to firms size, large trade costs, large host country size, and in similarities in per
capita income, labour productivity, wages and unit labour costs. The coefficients of
these variables are highly significant. Only the coefficient of the R&D intensity does not
have the expected sign. It is negative and significantly so, in particular in later sub-
periods. This result is contrary to expectation. As Norbäck (1998) pointed out, this may
be related to the fact that the technology transfer from parents to affiliates is not
independent of the magnitude of the R&D intensity, as commonly assumed in the
literature, as well as in the theoretical model by Markusen et al. (1996).
 This particularly interesting as this effects appears to be strongest after 1986,
and may therefore be explained as an effect of the massive FDI investment in Europe,
which by large is done via mergers and acquisitions. In the short- to medium-term,
production and technologies are transferred to the acquired affiliate. The costs of these
transfers may well be related to the magnitude of the R&D intensity.
The empirical results suggest further that vertically integrated multinationals are
able to compensate production below minimum efficient scale, this being the case for
vertically forward integrated multinationals in particular, in geographically fragmenting
production stages to exploit difference in relative factor endowments, such technologies,
human capital and labour costs. Also, there is some evidence that the emergence of
vertically integrated multinationals is promoted by low trade costs. This is particularly18
the case for the sample covering the period 1974-1994. This result is strongest for both
vertically forward and backward integrated multinationals.
The host country size seems of greater importance for vertically forward
integrated than for horizontally integrated multinationals. There is some weak evidence
that vertically backward integrated multinationals have the opposite tendency,
particularly during the period 1974-1986.
Integration Effects
The Wald-statistics in the tables provide a test of whether the coefficients in the
respective sub-periods are significantly different from each other. The clearest effects of
SEM and SIL are that horizontal multinationals are increasingly associated with large
economies of scale. In other words, large economies of scale deter horizontal
multinationals more after 1986 than prior to SEM and SIL. This in line with the fact that
much of the industrial restructuring occurs via mergers with, and acquisitions of,
competitors. The likely take-over targets are host country competitors, which operate in
the same industry, produce a similar product range, and have similar technological and
productive capabilities. The SEM has also meant that fast market access becomes
increasingly important. Some of the acquisitions may also be motivated by gaining
access to better distribution through established distribution and wholesaling networks.
In doing so, firms gain the necessary economies of scale to compete successfully in an
increasingly competitive environment. This phenomenon was also reported of Swedish
firms, who took the principal bidding role in the M&A process during the period 1990-
1995 (European Commission, 1996). Acquired affiliates are much less likely to import
from the parent company (Andersson et al., 1996), and may have been subject to the
capital control restrictions for this reason.
Large trade costs have an increasingly positive effect on horizontally integrated
multinationals. This is particularly the case in specification (II) in the sub-period 1990-
1994. Again, this change consistent with increasing competitive environment, forcing
companies to restructure their foreign operations. It is conceivable that some potential
multinationals were constrained by Swedish capital control restrictions. Prior to
Swedish investment liberalisation some firms may have exported to individual EU
countries rather than established horizontally integrated affiliates, despite the fact that19
the size of the industry specific trade costs may have favoured multinational production
over exporting.
Acquired affiliates are also less dependent on technology transfer, as is
embodied in intermediate products, than affiliates that have been established through
greenfield investment. In short-term, however, personnel, scientists, and other
managerial staff have to be sent back and forth to and from acquired affiliates in order to
supervise the implementation of firm-specific assets. Thus, significant costs may have to
be incurred, which may in turn be related to the firms-specific assets, i.e. the R&D and
marketing intensities. This may explain the significantly negative coefficient of the
R&D intensity during the integration period. The Wald-statistic does, however, not
indicate the presence of a structural break.
Another aim of the European integration process is to reduce the dissimilarities
of countries with respect to their per capita income levels. One such means is to provide
structural aid from Brussels to poorer regions and countries in the community. Recent
evidence indicates that indeed countries are converging (European Commission, 1996).
This is important in so far as this process may lead to increased multinational activity.
Moreover, it may lead to horizontally rather than vertically integrated multinationals.
Again, this is a relevant point, as the emergence of horizontal multinationals was not
particularly welcome prior to removal of the capital control restrictions in 1986.
With regard to relative factor endowments, there is indeed some evidence to
suggest that horizontal multinationals be increasingly attracted by similarities in relative
per capita incomes and wages. This is the case in tables 7 and 9. In contrast, vertically
forward integrated multinationals have an increased tendency to be attracted by
differences in relative per capita incomes and wages during the integration period. This
is very encouraging, as vertically forward integrated revealed a lesser tendency to be
attracted by relative factor endowment differences during the 1970s and 1980s than
vertically backward integrated multinationals. Hence, the fact that no significant
differences appear in the separate subgroups with regard to vertically backward
integrated multinationals is not discomforting. These multinationals have already shown
strong tendencies to be attracted by differences in relative factor endowments in the20
1970s, and continue to be so, possibly to a slightly lesser extent, in the 1980s and
1990s.
6
These results are relevant in so far as prior Swedish investment liberalisation and
European integration, vertically forward integrated multinationals had a tendency to
produce in industries with similar technologies, as would be predicted for horizontally
integrated multinationals. This stems from the fact that the coefficient estimates were
not significant different form horizontally integrated multinationals during the 1970s.
These changes are consistent with the objectives of the SEM to reduce non-tariff
barriers within the EU, which sheltered inefficient and unproductive industries. Hence,
prior to the SEM programme, vertically forward integrated multinationals were forced
to produce in less efficient locations due to market access considerations. Due to
increased integration, vertical multinationals are able to reap the benefits of exploiting
comparative advantages with regard to productivity, technology and human capital.
6. Concluding Remarks
This paper analyses how Swedish multinationals have been affected by the
policy changes in Europe and Sweden in the mid and late 1980s. It was first
demonstrated that the extent of vertical integration between parents and their affiliates
depends crucially on the level of aggregation at which vertical integration between
Swedish parents and their European affiliates is measured. Swedish multinationals
appear to be increasingly vertically integrated if, for example, the sum of total parents’
intermediate exports to EC affiliates is related to the sum of total parent exports to the
EC. Thus, on the aggregate level, total statistics point towards increased vertical
integration over time. The opposite, however, is the case with regard to the median of
total intermediate exports to EC affiliates as a share of total parent exports to the EC per
parent company. This may indicate that large Swedish multinationals are to an
increasing extent, vertically integrated, while small and newly established multinationals
are primarily horizontally integrated. Additionally, it appears that mixed forms of
integration have become a less popular choice for Swedish multinationals after 1986.
                                                
6  As mentioned previously, one contributing reason may be that Swedish multinationals acquiring
foreign competitors may sometimes appear more vertically backward integrated than they really are,
this being particularly the  case if former competitors were exporting to Sweden. In part, this may also
in part explain the magnitude of the negative coefficient of LUNITDIF and the subsequent structural
break reported in table 12.21
Both the removal of Swedish capital mobility restrictions and the Single
European Market programme have significantly affected Swedish multinationals.
Horizontally integrated multinationals are increasingly deterred by large plant-level
economies of scale. After 1986, supply side considerations have become increasingly
important in determining the location of multinational production. This is consistent
with the anticipated effects of increased efficiency and competition inside the EU.
Similarly, horizontal multinationals are increasingly associated with large trade costs.
For vertically forward-integrated multinationals are increasingly explained by
relative factor endowment differences in the integration period, while the opposite was
the case in the pre-integration period. Thus, these results indicate that foreign production
of vertically forward-integrated multinationals tended to take place at less efficient
locations to avoid non-tariff barriers and gain market access to individual markets. In
contrast, horizontally integrated multinationals show some tendencies to be increasingly
explained by technology and human capital similarities of industries. Thus, the policy
changes have affected Swedish multinationals in a way that is consistent with the
theoretical predictions.
Finally, it has to be mentioned that the restructuring process of Swedish
multinationals, be it due to the SEM and/or the SIL, has not been completed during the
period of this study. Further research in this area will be needed in the near future as it is
therefore not clear whether these results merely reflect the short-run adjustment
dynamics or indeed the new long-run equilibrium. This is also reflected by the
sensitivity of the results with regard to the choice of the integration period.22
7. Appendix
Table 7:
Tobit Estimates: Horizontally and vertically forward integrated multinationals, differences between periods 1974-1978 and 1986-1994
Specification (Ia) (Ib) (Ic) (Id)
Dependent variable AFFSH WALD- AFFSH WALD- AFFSH WALD- AFFSH WALD-
Interaction variable VFEU Statistic VFEU Statistic VFEU Statistic VFEU Statistic
Years 1974-1994 1974-1978 1986-1994 =
2
1 χ 1974-1994 1974-1978 1986-1994 =
2
1 χ 1974-1994 1974-1978 1986-1994 =
2
1 χ 1974-1994 1974-1978 1986-1994 =
2
1 χ
No. of obs. 1698 443 1255 1698 443 1255 1698 443 1255 1698 443 1255
R&D -2.109 -0.158 -3.242 1.839 -2.395 -0.423 -3.544 1.835 -2.327 -0.278 -3.385 1.834 -2.062 -0.284 -3.209 1.642
-2.181 -0.081 -2.797 -2.454 -0.213 -3.030 -2.412 -0.140 -2.946 -2.109 -0.145 -2.734
LSCALE -0.351 -0.276 -0.394 3.134 -0.350 -0.274 -0.392 3.220 -0.354 -0.274 -0.397 3.426 -0.351 -0.270 -0.394 3.577
-12.278 -4.871 -11.564 -12.320 -4.873 -11.638 -12.331 -4.848 -11.628 -12.342 -4.794 -11.631
LTRADE 0.141 0.082 0.118 0.115 0.144 0.082 0.119 0.122 0.154 0.081 0.138 0.296 0.149 0.100 0.126 0.060
3.150 0.925 2.085 3.268 0.939 2.131 3.486 0.929 2.475 3.344 1.128 2.234
LGDP 0.228 0.193 0.237 0.411 0.262 0.206 0.280 1.200 0.248 0.209 0.255 0.467 0.282 0.208 0.309 2.179
6.974 3.544 5.938 7.960 3.799 7.011 7.559 3.827 6.447 8.298 3.859 7.354
LINCDIF -0.382 -0.189 -0.450 1.348
-3.822 -0.983 -3.830
LVADIF -0.284 -0.210 -0.327 0.300
-3.111 -1.143 -3.087
LWAGEDIF -0.327 -0.091 -0.416 2.682
-3.480 -0.552 -3.715
LUNITDIF -0.365 -0.414 -0.314 0.074
-2.252 -1.351 -1.560
R&D-V 7.053 20.082 9.083 0.717 7.535 22.036 9.832 0.915 7.352 19.250 9.564 0.563 7.209 21.654 9.228 1.065
2.448 1.606 2.585 2.638 1.798 2.773 2.533 1.551 2.693 2.483 1.880 2.625
LSCALE-V 0.455 0.607 0.470 0.200 0.471 0.632 0.493 0.207 0.475 0.598 0.505 0.093 0.472 0.631 0.484 0.234
3.996 2.222 3.369 4.092 2.322 3.519 4.086 2.232 3.578 4.151 2.328 3.513
LTRADE-V -0.306 -0.796 -0.169 0.740 -0.347 -0.908 -0.207 1.043 -0.360 -0.775 -0.251 0.579 -0.330 -0.938 -0.200 1.215
-1.580 -1.170 -0.647 -1.890 -1.423 -0.817 -1.925 -1.212 -0.977 -1.785 -1.515 -0.786
LGDP-V 0.086 0.133 0.070 0.580 0.083 0.132 0.069 0.574 0.088 0.132 0.077 0.447 0.083 0.116 0.073 0.265
2.481 1.915 1.568 2.366 1.901 1.519 2.465 1.931 1.690 2.386 1.643 1.646
LINCDIF-V -0.013 -0.233 0.183 0.318
-0.047 -0.355 0.544
LVADIF-V 0.508 0.158 0.710 0.677
1.655 0.283 1.898
LWAGEDIF-V 0.390 -0.309 0.643 2.760
1.505 -0.663 1.929
LUNITDIF-V 0.713 1.328 0.582 0.148
1.158 0.742 0.782
Log likelihood -1219.2 -335.5 -870.4 -1224.0 -335.7 -874.2 -1222.2 -336.1 -871.5 -1226.5 -335.3 -877.9
Log likel. Ratio test 26.6 28.2 29.2 26.6
T-statistic in italics. Time fixed effects are included. Estimates are heteroscedasticity consistent. The suffix -V indicates the inclusion of a vertical interaction term.23
Table 8:
Tobit Estimates: Horizontally and vertically forward integrated multinationals, differences between periods 1974-1986 and 1990-1994
Specification (Ia) (Ib) (Ic) (Id)
Dependent variable AFFSH WALD- AFFSH WALD- AFFSH WALD- AFFSH WALD-
Interaction variable VFEU Statistic VFEU Statistic VFEU Statistic VFEU Statistic
Years 1974-1994 1974-1986 1990-1994 =
2
1 χ 1974-1994 1974-1986 1990-1994 =
2
1 χ 1974-1994 1974-1986 1990-1994 =
2
1 χ 1974-1994 1974-1986 1990-1994 =
2
1 χ
No. of obs. 1698 837 861 1698 837 861 1698 837 861 1698 837 861
R&D -2.109 -1.460 -2.489 0.256 -2.395 -1.620 -3.011 0.454 -2.327 -1.601 -2.904 0.416 -2.062 -1.498 -2.315 0.154
-2.181 -1.256 -1.493 -2.454 -1.383 -1.772 -2.412 -1.368 -1.764 -2.109 -1.298 -1.334
LSCALE -0.351 -0.271 -0.463 10.596 -0.350 -0.267 -0.462 11.124 -0.354 -0.270 -0.471 11.605 -0.351 -0.268 -0.467 11.456
-12.278 -7.226 -10.161 -12.320 -7.178 -10.257 -12.331 -7.195 -10.309 -12.342 -7.176 -10.271
LTRADE 0.141 0.050 0.212 2.467 0.144 0.060 0.199 1.866 0.154 0.067 0.216 2.200 0.149 0.070 0.216 2.024
3.150 0.842 2.524 3.268 1.019 2.416 3.486 1.131 2.644 3.344 1.180 2.580
LGDP 0.228 0.231 0.214 0.068 0.262 0.248 0.270 0.126 0.248 0.244 0.237 0.010 0.282 0.261 0.292 0.216
6.974 5.588 4.243 7.960 5.896 5.713 7.559 5.834 4.881 8.298 6.090 5.830
LINCDIF -0.382 -0.208 -0.531 2.604
-3.822 -1.615 -3.467
LVADIF -0.284 -0.328 -0.290 0.039
-3.111 -2.208 -2.390
LWAGEDIF -0.327 -0.220 -0.428 1.262
-3.480 -1.672 -3.258
LUNITDIF -0.365 -0.453 -0.411 0.016
-2.252 -1.897 -1.759
R&D-V 7.053 6.015 10.594 0.481 7.535 6.361 11.730 0.642 7.352 5.834 11.992 0.869 7.209 6.490 10.873 0.443
2.448 1.392 2.122 2.638 1.559 2.206 2.533 1.416 2.322 2.483 1.601 2.095
LSCALE-V 0.455 0.415 0.492 0.084 0.471 0.427 0.491 0.059 0.475 0.420 0.535 0.190 0.472 0.444 0.481 0.020
3.996 2.929 2.222 4.092 2.912 2.268 4.086 2.916 2.430 4.151 2.987 2.258
LTRADE-V -0.306 -0.294 0.086 0.539 -0.347 -0.397 0.108 1.026 -0.360 -0.372 0.035 0.677 -0.330 -0.399 0.121 1.063
-1.580 -0.947 0.207 -1.890 -1.368 0.266 -1.925 -1.253 0.089 -1.785 -1.353 0.296
LGDP-V 0.086 0.099 0.048 0.359 0.083 0.080 0.050 0.126 0.088 0.090 0.060 0.125 0.083 0.076 0.052 0.082
2.481 2.412 0.651 2.366 1.869 0.685 2.465 2.137 0.822 2.386 1.775 0.719
LINCDIF-V -0.013 -0.823 0.635 5.760
-0.047 -1.761 1.636
LVADIF-V 0.508 0.620 0.438 0.073
1.655 1.138 1.120
LWAGEDIF-V 0.390 -0.185 0.826 3.426
1.505 -0.463 2.213
LUNITDIF-V 0.713 1.508 0.336 0.714
1.158 1.428 0.374
Log likelihood -1219.2 -611.5 -590.7 -1224.0 -613.4 -594.6 -1222.2 -614.3 -591.2 -1226.5 -614.1 -595.8
Log likel. Ratio test 34.0 32.0 33.4 33.2
T-statistic in italics. Time fixed effects are included. Estimates are heteroscedasticity consistent. The suffix -V indicates the inclusion of a vertical interaction term.24
Table 9:
Tobit Estimates: Horizontally and vertically backward integrated multinationals, differences between periods 1974-1978 and 1986-1994
Specification (IIa) (IIb) (IIc) (IId)
Dependent variable AFFSH WALD- AFFSH WALD- AFFSH WALD- AFFSH WALD-
Interaction variable VBEU Statistic VBEU Statistic VBEU Statistic VBEU Statistic
Years 1974-1994 1974-1978 1986-1994 =
2
1 χ 1974-1994 1974-1978 1986-1994 =
2
1 χ 1974-1994 1974-1978 1986-1994 =
2
1 χ 1974-1994 1974-1978 1986-1994 =
2
1 χ
No. of obs. 1655 435 1220 1655 435 1220 1655 435 1220 1655 435 1220
R&D -1.955 1.139 -2.928 2.723 -2.371 0.672 -3.149 2.406 -2.510 0.465 -3.228 2.279 -1.816 1.420 -2.784 2.815
-2.207 0.509 -2.833 -2.729 0.299 -3.123 -2.871 0.209 -3.179 -2.078 0.621 -2.717
LSCALE -0.341 -0.210 -0.407 12.250 -0.343 -0.213 -0.407 11.991 -0.347 -0.215 -0.413 12.158 -0.338 -0.199 -0.404 13.859
-12.285 -4.765 -11.554 -12.432 -4.908 -11.644 -12.367 -4.857 -11.622 -12.374 -4.631 -11.645
LTRADE 0.214 0.183 0.214 0.065 0.219 0.175 0.225 0.179 0.231 0.185 0.244 0.239 0.217 0.194 0.216 0.031
4.433 1.713 3.775 4.587 1.648 4.022 4.800 1.763 4.313 4.536 1.803 3.826
LGDP 0.232 0.199 0.235 0.276 0.257 0.194 0.274 1.405 0.245 0.203 0.251 0.491 0.295 0.242 0.305 0.771
6.972 3.632 5.815 7.794 3.595 6.896 7.359 3.699 6.247 8.405 4.214 7.243
LINCDIF -0.551 -0.573 -0.518 0.052
-5.166 -2.715 -4.262
LVADIF -0.460 -0.586 -0.425 0.406
-4.712 -2.595 -3.761
LWAGEDIF -0.480 -0.421 -0.495 0.098
-4.739 -2.090 -4.185
LUNITDIF -0.353 -0.308 -0.408 0.067
-1.993 -0.956 -1.906
R&D-V 1.231 -5.394 1.409 0.103 4.066 -0.589 2.749 0.025 5.883 1.772 4.161 0.013 -1.943 -13.075 0.194 0.369
0.233 -0.267 0.219 0.778 -0.029 0.440 1.078 0.088 0.636 -0.363 -0.625 0.031
LSCALE-V 0.224 0.350 0.360 0.001 0.172 0.308 0.369 0.019 0.174 0.311 0.395 0.035 0.074 0.016 0.260 0.307
1.379 1.014 1.552 1.041 0.816 1.593 1.064 0.805 1.696 0.450 0.042 1.140
LTRADE-V -0.414 -0.338 -0.627 0.060 -0.450 -0.342 -0.796 0.156 -0.486 -0.407 -0.877 0.175 -0.277 -0.233 -0.499 0.052
-1.140 -0.311 -1.361 -1.217 -0.325 -1.721 -1.311 -0.398 -1.861 -0.758 -0.216 -1.096
LGDP-V -0.025 -0.088 0.052 1.613 -0.035 -0.065 0.053 1.046 -0.035 -0.070 0.062 1.235 -0.010 -0.059 0.049 0.712
-0.480 -1.089 0.694 -0.666 -0.739 0.710 -0.676 -0.774 0.804 -0.195 -0.567 0.657
LINCDIF-V 2.113 3.793 1.226 4.163
4.317 3.519 1.887
LVADIF-V 2.124 2.715 1.828 0.524
3.955 3.069 2.158
LWAGEDIF-V 1.933 2.372 1.695 0.351
3.788 2.837 2.177
LUNITDIF-V 0.279 1.869 0.231 0.181
0.165 0.570 0.114
Log likelihood -1205.0 -320.7 -867.3 -1205.9 -322.6 -869.0 -1205.0 -324.1 -866.7 -1221.7 -333.3 -875.5
Log likel. Ratio test 34.0 28.6 28.4 25.8
T-statistic in italics. Time fixed effects are included. Estimates are heteroscedasticity consistent. The suffix -V indicates the inclusion of a vertical interaction term.25
Table 10:
Tobit Estimates: Horizontally and vertically backward integrated multinationals, differences between periods 1974-1986 and 1990-1994
Specification (IIa) (IIb) (IIc) (IId)
Dependent variable AFFSH WALD- AFFSH WALD- AFFSH WALD- AFFSH WALD-
Interaction variable VBEU Statistic VBEU Statistic VBEU Statistic VBEU Statistic
Years 1974-1994 1974-1986 1990-1994 =
2
1 χ 1974-1994 1974-1986 1990-1994 =
2
1 χ 1974-1994 1974-1986 1990-1994 =
2
1 χ 1974-1994 1974-1986 1990-1994 =
2
1 χ
No. of obs. 1655 829 826 1655 829 826 1655 829 826 1655 829 826
R&D -1.955 -0.824 -2.208 0.499 -2.371 -1.171 -2.668 0.608 -2.510 -1.336 -2.804 0.573 -1.816 -0.974 -1.705 0.139
-2.207 -0.720 -1.388 -2.729 -1.046 -1.710 -2.871 -1.179 -1.783 -2.078 -0.857 -1.066
LSCALE -0.341 -0.220 -0.478 20.385 -0.343 -0.217 -0.478 21.532 -0.347 -0.221 -0.488 21.445 -0.338 -0.218 -0.478 21.658
-12.285 -6.923 -10.032 -12.432 -6.977 -10.149 -12.367 -7.029 -10.105 -12.374 -6.904 -10.360
LTRADE 0.214 0.092 0.322 4.715 0.219 0.079 0.318 5.289 0.231 0.101 0.334 5.000 0.217 0.111 0.308 3.488
4.433 1.385 3.911 4.587 1.181 4.018 4.800 1.509 4.171 4.536 1.630 3.810
LGDP 0.232 0.243 0.209 0.270 0.257 0.242 0.264 0.125 0.245 0.247 0.230 0.064 0.295 0.293 0.280 0.036
6.972 5.593 4.197 7.794 5.612 5.776 7.359 5.660 4.789 8.405 6.366 5.851
LINCDIF -0.551 -0.547 -0.544 0.000
-5.166 -3.714 -3.563
LVADIF -0.460 -0.616 -0.371 1.423
-4.712 -3.839 -2.882
LWAGEDIF -0.480 -0.494 -0.474 0.009
-4.739 -3.267 -3.485
LUNITDIF -0.353 -0.352 -0.328 0.005
-1.993 -1.397 -1.309
R&D-V 1.231 -6.866 -3.239 0.043 4.066 -5.458 -1.148 0.059 5.883 -2.586 0.761 0.035 -1.943 -8.261 -1.363 0.158
0.233 -1.000 -0.202 0.778 -0.805 -0.070 1.078 -0.368 0.046 -0.363 -1.174 -0.086
LSCALE-V 0.224 -0.076 0.374 1.262 0.172 -0.186 0.410 2.258 0.174 -0.190 0.453 2.528 0.074 -0.198 0.168 0.802
1.379 -0.391 1.068 1.041 -0.896 1.213 1.064 -0.922 1.302 0.450 -0.935 0.480
LTRADE-V -0.414 0.259 -0.836 1.230 -0.450 0.443 -1.060 2.275 -0.486 0.313 -1.128 2.084 -0.277 0.284 -0.353 0.363
-1.140 0.547 -0.965 -1.217 0.894 -1.226 -1.311 0.644 -1.294 -0.758 0.557 -0.381
LGDP-V -0.025 -0.140 0.080 2.380 -0.035 -0.157 0.085 2.809 -0.035 -0.158 0.095 3.032 -0.010 -0.116 0.080 1.834
-0.480 -2.235 0.623 -0.666 -2.393 0.660 -0.676 -2.411 0.731 -0.195 -1.651 0.633
LINCDIF-V 2.113 2.752 1.138 2.021
4.317 3.945 1.270
LVADIF-V 2.124 2.609 1.477 0.998
3.955 4.341 1.538
LWAGEDIF-V 1.933 2.207 1.540 0.378
3.788 3.700 1.701
LUNITDIF-V 0.279 1.814 -7.777 2.997
0.165 0.938 -1.498
Log likelihood -1205.0 -602.0 -585.7 -1205.9 -600.3 -587.9 -1205.0 -603.1 -585.3 -1221.7 -615.4 -587.3
Log likel. Ratio test 34.0 35.4 33.2 38.0
T-statistic in italics. Time fixed effects are included. Estimates are heteroscedasticity consistent. The suffix -V indicates the inclusion of a vertical interaction term.26
Table 11:
Tobit Estimates: Horizontally and vertically forward & backward integrated multinationals, differences between periods 1974-1978 and 1986-1994
Specification (IIIa) (IIIb) (IIIc) (IIId)
Dependent variable AFFSH WALD- AFFSH WALD- AFFSH WALD- AFFSH WALD-
Interaction variable VFBEU Statistic VFBEU Statistic VFBEU Statistic VFBEU Statistic
Years 1974-1994 1974-1978 1986-1994 =
2
1 χ 1974-1994 1974-1978 1986-1994 =
2
1 χ 1974-1994 1974-1978 1986-1994 =
2
1 χ 1974-1994 1974-1978 1986-1994 =
2
1 χ
No. of obs. 1655 435 1220 1655 435 1220 1655 435 1220 1655 435 1220
R&D -1.643 -0.155 -3.167 1.086 -2.191 -0.679 -3.617 0.978 -1.999 -0.722 -3.215 0.705 -1.649 -0.116 -3.021 0.993
-1.406 -0.062 -2.186 -1.851 -0.262 -2.484 -1.707 -0.278 -2.239 -1.384 -0.046 -2.048
LSCALE -0.353 -0.281 -0.396 2.638 -0.352 -0.279 -0.394 2.702 -0.357 -0.280 -0.399 2.746 -0.350 -0.266 -0.394 3.495
-11.926 -4.553 -11.332 -11.995 -4.598 -11.420 -11.954 -4.493 -11.361 -11.947 -4.490 -11.356
LTRADE 0.162 0.115 0.140 0.047 0.164 0.111 0.144 0.079 0.181 0.114 0.172 0.248 0.166 0.118 0.150 0.071
3.293 1.130 2.305 3.416 1.091 2.398 3.713 1.125 2.819 3.369 1.157 2.435
LGDP 0.228 0.193 0.234 0.369 0.254 0.192 0.274 1.525 0.242 0.193 0.251 0.755 0.288 0.225 0.307 1.358
6.921 3.506 5.862 7.810 3.570 6.981 7.368 3.584 6.344 8.409 4.041 7.353
LINCDIF -0.489 -0.430 -0.486 0.051
-4.589 -2.031 -3.894
LVADIF -0.449 -0.549 -0.430 0.218
-4.481 -2.394 -3.743
LWAGEDIF -0.472 -0.377 -0.497 0.255
-4.526 -1.841 -4.069
LUNITDIF -0.378 -0.541 -0.350 0.223
-2.152 -1.587 -1.603
R&D-V 4.813 10.378 7.040 0.105 6.214 12.763 8.077 0.200 5.736 12.551 7.080 0.269 5.033 8.298 6.839 0.021
1.589 1.085 1.869 2.063 1.304 2.172 1.889 1.272 1.905 1.627 0.898 1.807
LSCALE-V 0.377 0.411 0.384 0.016 0.381 0.431 0.391 0.034 0.387 0.410 0.406 0.000 0.360 0.353 0.372 0.008
3.881 2.260 3.225 3.941 2.366 3.305 4.008 2.237 3.433 3.756 1.924 3.176
LTRADE-V -0.462 -0.489 -0.419 0.019 -0.471 -0.534 -0.437 0.039 -0.509 -0.502 -0.514 0.001 -0.449 -0.362 -0.426 0.016
-2.559 -1.098 -1.812 -2.719 -1.216 -1.936 -2.886 -1.150 -2.222 -2.453 -0.823 -1.839
LGDP-V 0.065 0.065 0.063 0.001 0.056 0.064 0.054 0.028 0.065 0.062 0.069 0.013 0.066 0.039 0.066 0.178
2.158 1.397 1.635 1.895 1.372 1.394 2.169 1.292 1.755 2.189 0.753 1.708
LINCDIF-V 0.509 0.831 0.267 0.997
1.821 2.208 0.636
LVADIF-V 1.057 1.218 0.967 0.207
4.084 2.959 2.618
LWAGEDIF-V 0.931 0.946 0.819 0.057
3.642 2.538 2.163
LUNITDIF-V 0.383 2.161 0.160 1.585
0.632 1.528 0.221
Log likelihood -1190.8 -327.4 -852.7 -1190.9 -325.8 -854.5 -1190.6 -327.7 -852.8 -1200.5 -328.5 -860.5
Log likel. Ratio test 21.4 21.2 20.2 23.0
T-statistic in italics. Time fixed effects are included. Estimates are heteroscedasticity consistent. The suffix -V indicates the inclusion of a vertical interaction term.27
Table 12:
Tobit Estimates: Horizontally and vertically forward & backward integrated multinationals, differences between periods 1974-1986 and 1990-1994
Specification (IIIa) (IIIb) (IIIc) (IIId)
Dependent variable AFFSH WALD- AFFSH WALD- AFFSH WALD- AFFSH WALD-
Interaction variable VFBEU Statistic VFBEU Statistic VFBEU Statistic VFBEU Statistic
Years 1974-1994 1974-1986 1990-1994 =
2
1 χ 1974-1994 1974-1986 1990-1994 =
2
1 χ 1974-1994 1974-1986 1990-1994 =
2
1 χ 1974-1994 1974-1986 1990-1994 =
2
1 χ
No. of obs. 1655 829 826 1655 829 826 1655 829 826 1655 829 826
R&D -1.643 -0.001 -3.752 0.003 -2.191 -0.206 -4.461 2.562 -1.999 -0.172 -4.203 2.377 -1.649 -0.189 -3.550 1.650
-1.406 0.000 -1.721 -1.851 -0.139 -2.023 -1.707 -0.116 -1.952 -1.384 -0.129 -1.637
LSCALE -0.353 -0.265 -0.469 10.848 -0.352 -0.259 -0.468 11.715 -0.357 -0.265 -0.476 11.509 -0.350 -0.261 -0.474 11.997
-11.926 -6.791 -9.743 -11.995 -6.785 -9.853 -11.954 -6.750 -9.834 -11.947 -6.773 -9.879
LTRADE 0.162 0.084 0.196 1.008 0.164 0.083 0.180 0.763 0.181 0.098 0.206 0.951 0.166 0.097 0.191 0.686
3.293 1.221 2.209 3.416 1.237 2.057 3.713 1.439 2.358 3.369 1.375 2.145
LGDP 0.228 0.233 0.215 0.072 0.254 0.237 0.268 0.247 0.242 0.237 0.235 0.001 0.288 0.274 0.290 0.060
6.921 5.521 4.299 7.810 5.698 5.783 7.368 5.639 4.875 8.409 6.240 5.980
LINCDIF -0.489 -0.401 -0.545 0.455
-4.589 -2.788 -3.452
LVADIF -0.449 -0.624 -0.354 1.579
-4.481 -3.662 -2.722
LWAGEDIF -0.472 -0.451 -0.479 0.018
-4.526 -2.898 -3.394
LUNITDIF -0.378 -0.518 -0.357 0.205
-2.152 -1.976 -1.474
R&D-V 4.813 1.708 11.339 1.448 6.214 2.523 12.526 1.531 5.736 2.501 12.018 1.431 5.033 2.359 12.955 1.736
1.589 0.456 1.603 2.063 0.677 1.746 1.889 0.665 1.714 1.627 0.635 1.816
LSCALE-V 0.377 0.312 0.402 0.133 0.381 0.324 0.391 0.075 0.387 0.322 0.415 0.142 0.360 0.312 0.363 0.045
3.881 2.656 1.868 3.941 2.769 1.832 4.008 2.754 1.930 3.756 2.662 1.721
LTRADE-V -0.462 -0.413 -0.165 0.299 -0.471 -0.419 -0.138 0.399 -0.509 -0.451 -0.209 0.295 -0.449 -0.417 -0.026 0.724
-2.559 -1.555 -0.450 -2.719 -1.640 -0.380 -2.886 -1.723 -0.579 -2.453 -1.524 -0.070
LGDP-V 0.065 0.055 0.039 0.041 0.056 0.043 0.033 0.016 0.065 0.052 0.043 0.014 0.066 0.047 0.037 0.015
2.158 1.553 0.567 1.895 1.240 0.473 2.169 1.497 0.618 2.189 1.329 0.553
LINCDIF-V 0.509 0.420 0.494 0.013
1.821 1.218 0.892
LVADIF-V 1.057 1.428 0.553 2.586
4.084 4.031 1.337
LWAGEDIF-V 0.931 0.922 0.733 0.130
3.642 2.917 1.759
LUNITDIF-V 0.383 1.489 -1.186 3.442
0.632 1.766 -1.014
Log likelihood -1190.8 -602.8 -574.8 -1190.9 -596.9 -577.8 -1190.6 -601.7 -575.0 -1200.5 -605.0 -578.2
Log likel. Ratio test 26.6 32.4 27.8 34.6
T-statistic in italics. Time fixed effects are included. Estimates are heteroscedasticity consistent. The suffix -V indicates the inclusion of a vertical interaction term.28
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